Download Citation on ResearchGate | Content and Self-Knowledge | La these Pastist externalists (e.g., Boghossian ; Burge ) maintain that the past. Volume 17, Issue 1, Spring Philosophy of Mind. Paul A. Boghossian. Pages DOI: /philtopics Content and Self-Knowledge. Content and Self-Knowledge. Paul A. Boghossian University of Michigan. INTRODUCTION I. This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis.
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Science Logic and Mathematics. This slf-knowledge about linguistic meaning is then extended to the content of mental representations for natural kinds like water, and for non-natural kinds like sofas where the latter are defined by social convention McGinnStichBurge ; ; Note here that, if the deduction fails to prove the conclusion, this does not mean it transmits no warrant at all.
Externalism and Self-Knowledge
A final line against SK is that, if 1 self-nkowledge not apriori as is plausibleit follows that apriori knowledge of 2 is impossible Gertler The debate also touches on more specialized topics, including memory, concept acquisition, epistemic responsibility, and transcendental arguments. An argument for B 3 has yet to be given, but there are two on offer.
For one can imagine cases where slow switching is a relevant alternative.
But this does not yet imply that interacting with water is the only way that someone can arrive at water thoughts. So the way seems clear for the compatibilist to bkghossian the apriority of 1.
Thus, he grants this warrant only if he assumes that there is no Dry Earth illusion where 3 merely cintent to be true. For instance, suppose after the switch that Oscar judges: On this approach, the slow switch argument assumes that W does not express knowledge, since the subject S fails to track the truth in the following sense:.
Such variation among linguistic subgroups seems entirely commonplace. After all, if 1 is not apriori, then Oscar apparently cannot discriminate apriori between his water concept and the Dry Earthian concept. For more, see Fernandez as well as the entry on two-dimensional semantics. Self-knowlexge instance, suppose Oscar knows he is driving through a countryside with at least one barn, but some defeating condition is introduced e.
But the argument does not transmit warrant to its conclusion; it cannot bestow any warrant on 3 that was not already there. Singular Thought and the Cartesian Theory of Mind.
Where t 2 is a time after a slow switch, and t 1 is a time before, then: Davidson on Intentional Content and Self-Knowledge. So at least relative to that goal, Oscar may know what he thinks Parent b,ch.
Externalism and Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind categorize this paper. Collections Many works cited and further readings are found in the anthologies above: Many of the issues here turn on what kind of self-knowledge is allowed by EXT, and in particular, whether such knowledge is discriminating enough for justificatory purposes.
Whereas, 2 is apriori given SK. When Burge first presented his Twin Earth experiment, he conceded that it does not show that all mental contents satisfy EXT though it suggests that that is typically sop. But assuming 4why would EXT render 1 apriori? Some might find these science fiction stories extravagant, and it may be unclear whether they teach us anything about the real world.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University’s proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy. The issue is that EXT seemingly implies that knowing about content requires knowing about the environment. The two types of salad green also seem identical to the untrained eye or palate, as the case may be. So even for empty concepts, content seems determined partly by facts about the environment including facts about what is absent from the environment.
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Paul A. Boghossian, Content and Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind – PhilPapers
The contents of memory thus might be an exception. The argument is this: But for a rebuttal, see Brueckner Still, why does this reveal a problem with our self-knowledge? It shows merely that if EXT is true, self-knowledge is not necessarily within reach from the armchair.